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ABSTRACT
The rapid development of deep learning techniques has created new
challenges in identifying the origin of digital images because gen-
erative adversarial networks and variational autoencoders can create
plausible digital images whose contents are not present in natural
scenes. In this paper, we consider the origin that can be broken
down into three categories: natural photographic image (NPI), com-
puter generated graphic (CGG), and deep network generated image
(DGI). A method is presented for effectively identifying the origin
of digital images that is based on a convolutional neural network
(CNN) and uses a local-to-global framework to reduce training com-
plexity. By feeding labeled data, the CNN is trained to predict the
origin of local patches cropped from an image. The origin of the full-
size image is then determined by majority voting. Unlike previous
forensic methods, the CNN takes the raw pixels as input without the
aid of “residual map”. Experimental results revealed that not only
the high-frequency components but also the middle-frequency ones
contribute to origin identification. The proposed method achieved up
to 95.21% identification accuracy and behaved robustly against sev-
eral common post-processing operations including JPEG compres-
sion, scaling, geometric transformation, and contrast stretching. The
quantitative results demonstrate that the proposed method is more
effective than handcrafted feature-based methods.
Index Terms— image origin, convolutional neural network,
local-to-global, robustness
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, with the proliferation of powerful computer graphics
tools, such as Softimage XSI, Maya, and TerraGen, it has become
easy for non-professional technicians to artificially create digital
scenes without leaving any perceptible clues. Figures 1 (a) and (b)
show a natural photographic image (NPI) and a computer generated
graphic (CGG), respectively. At first glance, it is not obvious that
the second image was computer generated. In media forensics,
substantial efforts have been made to distinguish between a CGG
and an NPI. Statistical clues based on wavelet coefficients [1],
histograms [2], edge pixels [3], texture [4], entropy [5], and multi-
fractal spectrum [6] have been used to design handcrafted features
geared towards a particular classifier. Furthermore, pixel-level in-
consistencies such as JPEG compression artifacts [7], demosaicking
clues [8], lens aberration [9], and sensor pattern noise [10] are useful
indicators for identification. Recently, deep neural networks have
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(a) NPI (b) CGG (c) DGI
Fig. 1. Example digital images with different origins.
been the workhorse for a wide variety of computer vision tasks,
including image classification, image annotation, and object detec-
tion. Driven by data, CNNs have the ability to automatically learn
hierarchical representations, and thereby achieve better generaliza-
tion in an end-to-end manner. Hence, CNN-based methods [11–13]
have been quickly adopted by the multimedia security community
for distinguishing CGGs from NPIs.
Deep neural networks, however, are like a double-edged sword:
they can be used not only for identifying origin but also for generat-
ing photorealistic images if the network is structured as a generative
adversarial network (GAN) or variational autoencoder (VAE). Since
most generative models can be trained in an unsupervised manner, it
is not prohibitively expensive for an attacker to generate fake scenes
that can be maliciously used for illegal purposes. As evidenced by
the deep network generated image (DGI) in Fig.1 (c), it is not trivial
to identify DGIs with the naked eye. Several countermeasures have
been proposed recently. McCloskey and Albright [14] found that the
frequency of saturated and under-exposed pixels is suppressed by the
generator’s normalization steps, which provide useful discriminative
traces that enable a DGI to be distinguished from an NPI. Marra et
al. [15] revealed that specific correlation exists in the noise residual
of a DGI, which can be viewed as evidence of the origin of digital
images. Li et al. [16] exploited the disparities in color components
and designed a 588-dimensional feature vector based on multiple
color co-occurrence matrices. In addition, some CNN-based meth-
ods [17–20] attempt to identify DGIs and/or localize fake regions for
facial images.
According to the above survey, we conclude that digital im-
ages are created by one of three ways: (i) being captured with a
CCD or CMOS sensor, which counts the photons passing through a
color filter array, (ii) being synthesized using model-based rendering
software, and (iii) being generated using data-driven deep learning
model (e.g., GAN and VAE). However, the existing methods based
on handcrafted features [1–10, 14–16] can only distinguish a CGG
or DGI from an NPI. Therefore, an end-to-end method that can auto-
Fig. 2. Flowchart of proposed method.
matically probe discriminative features and complete the origin iden-
tification task is needed to ensure the information security of digital
images. To achieve this, we develop a CNN-based method in a local-
to-global framework. The experimental results demonstrate that the
proposed method is better in terms of identification accuracy and
robustness compared with handcrafted feature-based methods.
2. PROPOSEDMETHOD
The identification task considered in this paper is a three-class prob-
lem. Suppose that a training set comprises N samples along with
their labels {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xn, yn), · · · , (xN , yN)},
where n = 1, 2, · · · , N . The notation xn represents the n
th to-be-
identified sample while yn corresponds to its label. Our goal is to
exploit the training set and establish a CNN-based mapping function
F(·) so as to make correct predictions for new samples.
We use a local-to-global framework to reduce training complex-
ity. Specifically, for an RGB color image, we cropM local patches,
each of size 224 × 224 × 3. After the CNN model is trained, it is
expected to predict the correct label, denoted by yˆn, for each local
patch. The origin of the full-size image is then determined by ma-
jority voting. Figure 2 schematically illustrates the flowchart of the
proposed method. Using the local-to-global framework not only re-
duces training complexity but also forces the CNN model to learn
forensic clues rather than recognize the image contents.
2.1. Patch Cropping
Sampling representative data is an important prerequisite for train-
ing a statistical learning model. Motivated by the observation that
highly textured areas usually contain clues about factitiousness, we
preferentially crop patches containing rich edge pixels. Specifically,
the edge pixels are detected by Canny detector. The high and low
threshold values are set to 50 and 100, respectively. The image is
then partitioned into overlapping patches with an appropriate stride
to ensure that the number of candidate patches exceeds 20M . The
number of edge pixels within a candidate patch is considered to be
the fitness value. From the 20M candidate patches, roulette wheel
selection, which is widely used in genetic algorithms, is performed
to choose M ones without replacement. Compared with random
cropping, the roulette-based strategy can avoid cropping too many
smooth patches.
Fig. 3. Proposed CNN architecture.
2.2. Data Augmentation
As a regularization technique, data augmentation protects well
against overfitting. The training set is artificially expanded by gener-
ating new instances from existing ones. To this end, the patches are
rotated by 90◦, 180◦, and 270◦, and horizontal and vertical flipping
are performed. A total of 6M patches can be harvested from a
full-size image by combining these geometric transformations.
Furthermore, these newly generated patches help the model to be
more robust against rotation and flipping. The experimental results
presented in Section 3 support this claim.
2.3. Network Architecture
CNNs typically consist of a cascade connection of multiple convo-
lutional layers, pooling operations, and one or more fully connected
(FC) layers. Each convolutional layer, which can be viewed as a
group of filters, is trained to produce an appropriate feature represen-
tation. Each pooling operation, which computes a summary statistic
of a certain layer’s output, helps to make the feature representation
approximately invariant to small translations. The learned hierar-
chical representation is fed into the FC layer, which plays a role in
making correct predictions.
The proposed CNN architecture is shown in Fig. 3. The in-
put local patches are 224 × 224 × 3. The CNN model consists of
seven convolutional layers, five pooling operations and one FC layer.
Specifically, there are 64, 64, 32, 32, 64, 64, and 128 filters for the 7
convolutional layers, respectively. The filters are all 3× 3 and have
a unit stride. A rectified linear unit (ReLU) is used for activation. In
each convolutional layer, batch normalization is used to mitigate the
problem of internal covariate shift, making the model significantly
easier to train. The outputs of the last five convolutional layers are
further processed by a 2 × 2 max-pooling operation with stride 2.
The final FC layer contains 2048 neural nodes followed by a three-
way softmax function.
In previous steganalysis and forensics methods [16, 17], the in-
put is pre-processed using fixed high-pass filters to suppress image
contents and extract the so-called “residual map”. However, there is
no evidence to suggest that the middle (or low) frequency compo-
nents make no contribution to the forensics task. We therefore skip
this pre-processing step and make all the filters trainable in the hope
of adaptively probing useful information.
2.4. Training
We trained the CNN model using two scenarios. In scenario 1, the
first two convolutional layers simply duplicate the previously trained
‘conv1 1’ and ‘conv1 2’ of the VGG19 model [21], and the corre-
sponding weights are kept fixed during future training. In scenario 2,
all layers are trained without any constraints by directly using task-
dependent data. For convenience, we call these two scenarios ‘vgg’
and ‘ada’, respectively.
The cross-entropy between yn and yˆn, where n = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
is defined as the cost function. A gradient-based stochastic optimiza-
tion method called ADAM [22] is used to update the weights with
a learning rate of 10−4, a minibatch size of 128, and three default
settings (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999, and ǫ = 10
−8). To prevent the
network from overfitting, a powerful regularization technique called
Dropout [23] is applied during the training phase to the FC layer
by setting the retention probability to 0.2. We empirically stop the
training process after ten epochs.
2.5. Dataset
We used a standard dataset called Columbia Photographic Im-
ages and Photorealistic Computer Graphics (PRCG) [24], which
contains 800 CGGs collected from the Internet and 800 NPIs
obtained from the personal collections. To prepare DGIs, we
used a pre-trained progressive GAN (ProGAN) [25] to generate
a sufficient number of high-quality images1. Then, we manu-
ally screened out the 800 most plausible ones and grouped them
into the third set. Unlike methods that focus on only facial im-
ages [17–20], our proposed method aims at origin identification.
Therefore, the images in the dataset encompass various scenes
and contents including human faces, animals, landscapes, objects,
plants, buildings, vehicles, etc., for each class (NPI, CGG, and
DGI). This enables us to train the model and thus make it more
suitable for real-world application. We show some samples of the
dataset online https://nii-yamagishilab.github.io/
Samples-Rong/Attack-Type-detection/.
3. EVALUATION
We experimentally evaluated our proposed method: (i) to determine
its identification accuracy, (ii) to study which frequency components
are more useful for origin identification, and (iii) to determine its
robustness against several post-processing operations including
JPEG compression, scaling, geometric transformation, and contrast
stretching. For comparative studies, we used three handcrafted
feature-based methods [2, 14, 16] as baselines.
3.1. Evaluation Method
In data preparation, we randomly divided the image dataset into three
subsets: training (70%), validation (10%), and test (20%). From
each training image, we cropped M = 200 local patches each of
size 224 × 224 × 3 and then performed geometric transformations
to expand the training set. This produced N = 2.016× 106 training
samples. The CNN model was implemented using the TensorFlow
framework. The computing platform consists of an i7-6770K 4GHz
CPU and a NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1070 GPU with 16GB memory.
For the three baselines, we extracted the tailor-made features and
uniformly used a discriminant analysis classifier. For the histogram-
based method [2], the number of bins was set to seven, as recom-
mended by the authors. We simply calculated the average accu-
racy over three color channels. For the saturation-based method
[14], each image was first converted from RGB into grayscale, and
then an 8-dimensional descriptor was constructed by combining both
the under- and over-exposed pixel frequencies. For the color co-
occurrence-based method [16], the order of the co-occurrence matrix
was set to 3 under a sample-aware scenario.
1The ProGAN was trained on the LSUN dataset [26] (category-wise) and
CelebA-HQ dataset [27].
(a) NPI (b) CGG (c) DGI
Fig. 4. Resulting examples of origin predications at patch level and
quantitative results of majority voting. First row shows results for
‘vgg’ scenario; second row shows results for ‘ada’ scenario.
Table 1. Identification accuracy and performance comparison.
3.2. Identification Accuracy Results
Figure 4 shows three examples of origin predication at the patch
level. The outputs of the CNNmodel are indicated by the red, green,
and blue bounding boxes, which correspond to ‘NPI’, ‘DGI’ and
‘CGG’, respectively. The panel above each resulting image shows
the voting table, which contains the number of bounding boxes by
color. As we saw, the majority voting stage has the ability to suppress
the objectionable outliers, thereby improving identification perfor-
mance at the image level.
The identification accuracy results obtained using the test set are
summarized in Table 1. Patch-level accuracy is defined as the ratio of
the number of correct predictions to the total number of test patches
while image-level accuracy is defined as the ratio of the number of
correct identifications to the total number of test images. The pro-
posed CNN-based method identified image’s origin with 95.21% ac-
curacy for the ‘ada’ scenario. The results in Table 1 show that our
method has higher accuracy scores than the three baseline methods.
In addition, the majority voting indeed boosted identification accu-
racy by 4.06% for the ‘vgg’ scenario and 2.31% for the ‘ada’ sce-
nario.
3.3. Frequency Components Results
To study which frequency components contain information about the
origin forensic, we focused on the first layer’s filters, which had been
trained under the ‘vgg’ or ‘ada’ scenario. Figure 6 shows images of
the 64 trained filters in the third channel. We found that the ‘ada’ sce-
nario forced the filter weights to diversify, meaning that more high-
frequency components were extracted and that more image contents
were suppressed. In contrast, the ‘vgg’ filters tended to extract richer
frequency components. This phenomenon is also supported, in Ta-
(a) JPEG (b) Scaling (c) Geometric transformation (d) Contrast stretching
Fig. 5. Accuracy evolutions for testing robustness against JPEG compression, scaling, geometric transformation, and contrast stretching.
Notation ‘h-flipping’ and ‘v-flipping’ mean horizontal and vertical flipping, respectively.
(a) ‘vgg’ filters (b) ‘ada’ filters
Fig. 6. Visualizing trained filters at the first convolutional layer (only
displaying those in the third channel for space considerations).
ble 2, by the channel-wise variances of the filter weights in the sense
that the variances for the ‘ada’ scenario were about twice those for
the ‘vgg’ scenario.
As shown by the accuracy scores in Table 1, the ‘ada’ scenario
outperformed the ‘vgg’ one, indicating that high-frequency compo-
nents possess more clues for identifying the origin. We also found
that several ‘ada’ filters, like the 47th one, were devoted to middle-
frequency components. This suggests that the middle-frequency
components also contribute to the origin identification.
3.4. Robustness Results
Since artificially created images may be further processed using
common image processing operations for special purposes, robust-
ness against various post-processing operations is highly desirable
for a good identification system. We thus examined the proposed
method in terms of robustness against JPEG compression, scaling,
geometric transformation, and contrast stretching. To this end, we
prepared new test sets. For JPEG robustness, each test image was
compressed for a large range of quality factors from 90 to 10 with
a step size of 20. For scaling robustness, we used bicubic interpo-
lation to resize the test images with scaling factors varying in the
range [0.9,1.7]. The geometric transformations included rotation
(90◦, 180◦ , 270◦), and horizontal/vertical flipping. For robustness
against contrast stretching, we used a piecewise-linear function that
expanded the range of intensity levels so as to span the full intensity
range. Two locations of points (rmin, 0) and (rmax, 255) control the
shape of the function, where rmin and rmax denote the minimum
and maximum intensity levels in the image, respectively. We de-
signed a stretching parameter, α, and manipulated rmin and rmax:
Table 2. Channel-wise weight variances of first layer.
r′min = (1 + α) · rmin, and r
′
max = (1 − α) · rmax. Note that patch
cropping was triggered again for each post-processed test image.
We conducted the robustness comparison with the three baseline
methods. The results were plotted in Fig. 5, where ‘Original’ indi-
cates the accuracy scores listed in Table 1. As shown in Fig. 5 (c),
the trained CNN model was particularly robust against geometric
transformations. This robustness is attributed to the diversity of the
training set after data augmentation. Moreover, the ‘vgg’ scenario
achieved a comeback win over the ‘ada’ one when the test images
were severely processed. This is because the ‘vgg’ filters, which
were trained using a large-scale data set, had better generalization to
deal with diverse samples.
For all four post-processing operations, the accuracy curves
for the proposed method progressively dropped while those for
the histogram-based method [2] and color co-occurrence-based
method [16] dramatically deteriorated. Although the saturation-
based method [14] had the most stable curves, its accuracy scores
were lower than 60%. Except for several extreme cases, our method
outperformed the three baseline methods even when the test im-
ages had undergone post-processing operations. Consequently, the
proposed method is better in terms of robustness than the other
methods [2, 14, 16].
4. CONCLUSION
We have presented an effective method based on a convolutional
neural network for identifying the origin of digital images. Roulette
wheel selection is used to crop 200 patches from an image while
considering edge information. After data augmentation, the CNN is
trained to predict the origin at the patch level while the origin of the
full-size image is determined by majority voting. We designed two
training scenarios, namely the ‘vgg’ and the ‘ada’. The experimental
results show that the ‘ada’ filters densely extracted high-frequency
features and achieved the highest accuracy 95.21%. The ‘vgg’ filter,
however, tended to probe various frequency components and exhib-
ited stronger robustness. Comparison of the results with those of
three handcrafted feature-based methods demonstrated that the pro-
posed method is better in terms of identification accuracy and ro-
bustness.
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